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How much work does language do in the interpretation 
of statutes? This symposium question returns me1 to the 
persistent argument of Justice Antonin Scalia, now entering 
his twenty-fifth year on the Supreme Court, that statutory 
language should and can do almost all of the work for courts in 
statutory interpretation cases. I agree, constitutionally, with 
the “should.” But with respect to the “can”—as Part II of this 
article explores through the voices of selected judges—in most 
appellate court cases statutory language cannot provide the 
ergs needed to answer the litigated question, although courts 
often wish that it would provide further guidance. 
I. THE SCALIA DOCTRINE OF LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL 
REACH 
Justice Scalia ascended to the Court under the banner 
of textualism—an interpretive theory that demands that judges 
follow the law as it is written. This alone should have been no 
head-turner. The Constitution commands such loyalty from its 
judges. If the language of a statute provides a clear answer to a 
question or questions presented in a case, “the sole function of 
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”2 And in the 
  
 † Eric J. Schmertz Professor of Public Law and Public Service at Hofstra 
Law School and Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center of Justice at NYU. Thanks to 
Lindsay Greene for her exploration and analysis of the statutory opinions of Justice 
Antonin Scalia from the Court’s 2009 term. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law Review 
for the opportunity to think again about statutory interpretation in the company of 
such distinguished colleagues. 
 1 See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia’s 
Revolutionary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121 (2000). 
 2 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265 (1990) (a statute is “a command issued 
by a superior body (the legislature) to a subordinate body (the judiciary)”). 
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overwhelming number of cases in which the meaning of the 
questioned statute is clear, the courts do apply the statutes as 
written. But the appellate courts’ commitment to the 
application of a statute’s clear meaning (the “clear” or “plain 
meaning” rule) is more of a rhetorical starting point than a 
reality. Cases that reach the Supreme Court or the states’ 
highest courts typically involve complex questions of statutory 
interpretation that courts cannot always resolve by examining 
a statute’s plain meaning.  
Sometimes, even when a statute’s language is clear, 
judges will ignore it. The primary reason for judges’ dismissal 
of plain statutory language is almost always their distaste for 
the consequences of applying a statute as it was written. Often, 
a court is sympathetic (or unsympathetic) to the plight of a 
particular party or to the particular policy expressed in a 
statute. But for the most part, courts do not nakedly announce 
their disobedience to the law.3 They do not want to confess their 
constitutional sins. Rather, they dress up their decision in 
language intended to convince the public that, despite the 
particular law’s clear command, the legislature never intended 
its application in this particular case.  
Of course, this is a construct. If the language of a 
statute is clear, a court should never find that extratextual 
evidence is sufficient to support a contrary statutory meaning. 
But the Court has not always remained faithful to this 
principle. Holy Trinity Church v. United States4 is an 
archetypal example of judicial disregard for clear statutory 
language. In Holy Trinity Church, the Court decided whether a 
church that imported a foreign minister violated a statute that 
  
 3 Sometimes a judge will actually acknowledge that his refusal to apply the 
clear language of a statute is based on his or her own view of what is right. For 
example, in dissent in United States v. Marshall, Judge Richard Posner anchored his 
view in “natural law” or judicial authority “to enrich positive law with the moral values 
and practical concerns of civilized society.” 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). In Marshall the question was whether a statute establishing penalties 
for the distribution of “10 grams or more of a mixture or a substance containing a 
detectable amount of . . . LSD” really meant what it said. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(v)-(B)(v) (2006). The problem for Posner was that the manner by which 
LSD was retailed might result in retailers being punished more seriously than 
suppliers or wholesalers. To Posner, this result was so unfair that he could not 
attribute it to any rational congressional intent, apparently never even imagining that 
Congress may have in fact wanted to strategically punish the lower, and more visible, 
end of the LSD marketing chain to reduce demand. What makes this case also very 
interesting is that only a year earlier in United States v. Rose, 881 F.2d 386, 387 (7th 
Cir. 1989), Judge Posner had applied the plain meaning of the same statute. 
 4  143 U.S. 457 (1891). 
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prohibited U.S. employers from paying for or assisting in the 
importation of foreigners “to perform labor or service of any 
kind” in U.S. territory.5 Although the clear language of the 
statute indicated that Holy Trinity Church was liable for 
importing the English minister, the Court could not bring itself 
to find that Congress had meant to include a minister within 
the definition of foreigners imported “to perform . . . service of 
any kind.” Reading the statute through the screen of its own 
Christian vision of America, the Court found this outcome 
distasteful and absurd, and rationalized its disregard of the 
statute’s clear language under the guise of preserving the 
statute’s legislative intent: “It is a familiar rule that a thing 
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of 
its makers.”6 The Court did not even consider the possibility 
that, although Congress clearly did not intend to restrict 
Christianity in the United States, it explicitly intended to 
provide an incentive for the employment of American citizens, 
including American ministers. Justice Scalia rightly 
characterizes this decision as “nothing but an invitation to 
judicial lawmaking.”7 
Despite notable cases like Holy Trinity Church, courts 
have generally honored their duty to apply clear statutory 
language as it was written, even prior to Scalia’s appointment 
to the bench. Yet, at the time of Scalia’s first judicial post in 
1982, public perception, fueled by Ronald Reagan’s first 
presidential campaign in 1980, fomented the belief that judicial 
activism was a widespread problem.8 These exaggerated claims 
of pervasive judicial lawmaking were, to a large extent, 
referring to the Court’s 1979 decision in United Steelworkers of 
America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber (United Steelworkers).9 In 
United Steelworkers, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 allowed a racially based job preference against a white 
person. The majority claimed that the antidiscriminatory 
  
 5  Id. at 458. 
 6 Id. at 459. 
 7 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 21 (1998). 
 8 See Sondra Hemeryck et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and 
Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475, 
501-02 (1990); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative 
Action, and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2001). 
 9 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). 
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purpose of the Civil Rights Act was limited to protecting 
minorities, and that this perceived limitation trumped the 
statute’s broad, inclusive, and clear anti-discriminatory 
language, because the complainant in United Steelworkers was 
white.10 The Court also disregarded the legislative record of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which evidenced a strong legislative 
commitment against affirmative action.11 This decision 
undermined the fundamental compromises that undergirded 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act and partially fueled the 
explosion of social opposition to affirmative action that helped 
blast Reagan into office in 1980.12  
For the type of judicial overreaching exemplified by 
United Steelworkers, Scalia’s commitment to textualism was 
and is a corrective approach. And over the years, it has had the 
positive effect of limiting courts’ occasional desire to reach 
beyond clear statutory text.13 But it is not Scalia’s textualism 
that has made him unique. Rather, it is his persistent refusal 
to use legislative history as a source for statutory meaning in 
situations where the statute itself does not provide a clear 
answer to the question before the Court. The litany of 
disavowals is familiar to even casual readers of the Court’s 
opinions: “I join the opinion of the Court [or the dissent], 
excluding, of course, its resort . . . to what was said by 
individual legislators and committees of legislators . . . .”14 Or, 
as he declared in his concurrence in Graham County Soil & 
Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, “[i]t 
is utterly impossible to discern what the Members of Congress 
intended except to the extent that intent is manifested in the 
only remnant of ‘history’ that bears the unanimous 
endorsement of the majority in each House: the text of the 
enrolled bill that became law.”15 
Scalia’s stated objection to legislative history is not the 
product of the entire legislature, but rather the product of a 
lesser body within the legislature (committees) or even of 
  
 10  Id. at 201-04. 
 11  See id. at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6564 
(1964)) (“Senator Kuchel emphasized[,] . . . ‘Employers and labor organizations could 
not discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his race, his religion, or his 
national origin. In such matters . . . the bill now before us . . . is color blind.’”). 
 12 See Hemeryck et al., supra note 8, at 501-02; Iheukwumere, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
 13 See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in 
the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205.  
 14 Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 344 
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 15 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1411 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
2011]  THE REAL POLITIK OF WRITING AND READING STATUTES 971 
individual members of Congress.16 First, this reliance on 
committee reports offends his view of the Constitution’s 
Presentment Clause and of Article I generally.17 Second, Scalia 
complains that committee reports, overall the most probative 
evidence of legislative meaning short of statutory language, are 
unread by members of Congress and are the products of their 
unsupervised staff.18 His basis for this determination is hard to 
find. In fact, rather than even look for empirical support, he 
effectively takes judicial notice of the verity of his own 
conclusion:  
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional 
committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases [in this 
particular example] were inserted, at best by a committee staff 
member on his or her own initiative, and at worst . . . at the 
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references 
was not primarily to inform Members of Congress . . . but rather to 
influence judicial construction.19 
Both criticisms are wrong. Constitutionally, Article I is 
not a barrier to the use of legislative history in cases of 
statutory interpretation. As Professor James Brudney has 
rightly written,  
Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to organize itself in 
fulfillment of its legislative mission and requires Congress to publish 
a record of its legislative proceedings. . . . [D]ating from the earliest 
Congresses, were the determination to favor detailed public 
reporting of floor debates and the decision to create permanent 
standing committees that produced oral and then written committee 
reports. Taken together, these innovations led to the development of 
legislative history as a means of informing and persuading members 
of Congress regarding the bills on which they were to vote.20 
Scalia’s second criticism of committee reports is strange, 
particularly given the absence of any evidence that it is true. 
While statistically it must be assumed that there are instances 
in which legislative staffers insert unauthorized material into 
legislative committee reports, as both Professors Victoria 
Nourse and James Brudney (both Senate staff alumni) 
reported at this symposium, such conduct is rare and would 
  
 16  See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 35. 
 17  See id.  
 18  Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 19 Id. 
 20 James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch 
Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
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most likely end in the offender’s termination. On this front, 
perhaps we would all be better served by Justice Scalia’s 
reaction to Judge Posner’s informed observation about judges 
delegating too much authority to law clerks.21  
The use of probative legislative history—legislative 
history on which Congress relies to establish meaning22—is 
both constitutional and, in Justice Stephen Breyer’s words, 
“natural.” “Legislative history helps a court understand the 
context and purpose of a statute.”23  
Legislative history also limits judicial law making 
(although Justice Scalia would disagree). Courts use legislative 
history to inform their understanding of statutes’ intended 
legislative meanings—a process that enhances, rather than 
inhibits, judicial deference to Congress’s law-making authority. 
The choice before courts in such cases is not between clear text 
and probative legislative history. Rather, the choice is almost 
always between probative legislative history and “whatever.” 
For Scalia, the “whatever” is either selected canons of statutory 
construction (including one principle that Abner Mikva and I 
characterized some years ago as “ambiguous statutes should be 
read narrowly”), or a form of the “reasonable man test,” 
through which he hopes to find a meaning that is “reasonable, 
consistent, and faithful to [the statute’s] apparent purpose.”24 
Of course, legislative history cannot be employed in this effort. 
Scalia characterizes this approach as a theory of statutory 
construction that gives meaning to the phrase “a government of 
laws.”25 But, in practice, this characterization is false. 
Rather, Justice Scalia’s aversion to the use of legislative 
history is, to paraphrase Judge Posner, more political than 
epistemological, more about freedom from “the fetters of text 
and legislative intent in applying statutes”26 than about finding 
the meaning of a statue. His goal is not merely to find the 
meaning of a statute in a particular case; more broadly, it is to 
systematically limit the legislative reach of statutes. It is the 
latter that necessitates Scalia’s canon of reading statutes 
narrowly. The review of cases that Mikva and I published in 
  
 21 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 225 (1985). 
 22 See generally Tiefer, supra note 13; Mikva & Lane, supra note 1, at 848. 
 23 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992). 
 24 Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989). 
 25 SCALIA, supra note 7, at 17. 
 26 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 271 (1990). 
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1999 evidence this point,27 and my review of cases from the 
Court’s last term, for the most part, confirms this perspective. 
II. THE REAL WORK OF READING STATUTES 
Most judges do not think that their work is so 
revolutionary. Years ago, I had the opportunity to explore this 
observation. The occasion was a panel that I was asked to plan 
and moderate for the U.S. Judicial Conference for the District 
of New Jersey.28 Among the panelists were former (then 
current) governor of New Jersey and former member of 
Congress, James Florio; circuit court Judge Robert Cowen; U.S. 
District Court judges for the District New Jersey Nicholas 
Politan and Stephen Orlofsky; prominent practitioners Fred 
Becker and Michael Cole; and finally, former member of 
Congress, former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, and former counsel to the President of the 
United States, Abner J. Mikva.  
I recount below much of the relevant exchange to show 
the inapplicability of Scalia’s theory of interpretation to unclear 
statutes, and to show what judges actually do to interpret 
statutes in the context of a particular case.  
The topic for the panel was the drafting and application 
of unclear statutes. For this topic, I chose section 703 of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the problem of 
determining which party has the burden of persuasion in 
disparate impact cases in which defendants assert the defense 
of business justification. The statute was silent on this point, 
and that silence created a serious litigation problem for 
potential plaintiffs. As Mr. Cole noted, “if you place the burden 
on the plaintiff we might as well not have adopted this statute 
because nothing will change. It is an impossible burden.”29 In 
fact, this concern was so prevalent that the Supreme Court 
addressed it twice. The first time, in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.,30 the Court placed the burden on employers. But eighteen 
years later, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,31 a far more 
  
 27 See generally Mikva & Lane, supra note 1. 
 28 The Twenty-First Annual United States Judicial Conference for the 
District of New Jersey, Mar. 13, 1997 [hereinafter Conference Transcript]. 
 29 Id. at 42. 
 30 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 31 490 U.S. 642 (1989). This decision was almost immediately reversed by the 
Congress through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
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conservative Court reversed Griggs by placing the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff employees.  
Just the mention of these two cases to the panel elicited 
an interesting exchange between Judges Mikva and Cowen 
regarding the role of the Supreme Court. Mikva saw the 
reversal as “cardinal sin” of statutory interpretation—judicial 
“policymaking in the worse sense of the word.”32 But Judge 
Cowen, for better or worse, believed that the role of the 
Supreme Court was fundamentally different, which was 
evidenced when he replied, “I want to slightly disagree with 
you Abner. . . . We have to recognize that the Supreme Court is 
really not a court. . . . It is a policy and social institution . . . . 
They are not, like a District Court or a Court of Appeals, bound 
by what they conceive to be the law.”33  
At the panel, the first question asked was why Congress 
would fail to address such an important issue. Florio responded 
that, while sometimes omissions were a matter of oversight, in 
this case it was more likely “a conscious policy by the 
legislature to make sure that something is ambiguous, because 
failure to have that ambiguity would result in no legislative 
outcome.”34 Mikva was blunter. He believed that for Congress, 
“[t]he easiest answer was to punt.”35 He later added a basic 
principle of legislative logic to his analysis—“a half a loaf is 
always better than nothing.”36  
Judges, at least those in this group, do not appreciate 
this logic. Ambiguity shifts the work of policy making to the 
courts, no matter how much they try to gussy up that fact. It is 
now up to the judge to decide the breadth of the statute in a 
particular case. And there are of course consequences for the 
losing party. Reflecting on that point, Judge Politan argued the 
following in response to the explanation provided by Florio and 
Mikva: 
[I] think they should not punt. This is not a game of punting. It is not 
a game of positioning. It is a game of discharging your legislative 
responsibility no matter how hard it may be. You have to respond to 
the people who vote for you. And don’t do that and switch it around, 
  
 32 Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 44. 
 33 Id. at 45. 
 34 Id. at 27. 
 35 Id. at 28. 
 36 Id. at 61. 
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punt it, throw it to the judiciary and then get up in Congress and say, 
they are legislating in the judiciary, they shouldn’t be doing that.37 
Judge Politan’s frustration perhaps could be eased if he had a 
better understanding of the legislative process. As was well 
established in Professor Nourse and Schacter’s article, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,38 
legislators and their staff have different missions, and operate 
under far different pressures and circumstances than judges. 
The most obvious difference is that, for a bill to become a law, 
it must have the support of at least a majority of members of 
each house—often a supermajority in the Senate—and the 
support of the President. As a result, the last thing that 
legislators and legislative staffers are worried about as they try 
to build supportive coalitions is whether a court will have a 
hard time applying the statute in the future. It is unknown 
whether Congress omitted specific regulation of the burden of 
proof for the business justification defense due to lack of 
foresight or as part of a legislative compromise. But from a 
legislative perspective, it was the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 that mattered, regardless of the potential problems 
that the courts or Congress may have later confronted.  
But judicial annoyance over legislative drafting does not 
remove a court’s duty to resolve the issue. The court has to 
make a decision. It cannot remand the case to the legislature 
or, as Judge Easterbrook has suggested, simply ignore the 
unclear statute.39 And to provide such answers, legislative 
history was the first place that at least two judicial members of 
the panel said they would look. In particular, Judge Orlofsky 
stated,  
I think that you have [to] sift through the history, and there is . . . 
good legislative and bad legislative history. The bad history is the 
kind . . . that you see on C-Span where someone is speaking to an 
empty chamber and has carte blanche to revise his or her remarks to 
say anything at all. Good legislative history or better legislative 
  
 37 Id. at 48. 
 38 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: 
A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575-76 (2002). 
 39 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). As 
Judge Politan aptly noted at the conference, “you can’t do that because you have 
litigators in front of you, you have people who want [and have a right to] answers to 
their problem.” Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 34. 
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history . . . is to look at the sponsor of a bill, or some of the major 
players who are involved in passing a particular bill . . . .40 
For Politan, the task was similar: “to sift through it, determine 
what is hot stuff, what is good stuff, what is bad stuff . . . and 
then make a judgment.”41 
Without legislative history, the judges saw the job for 
what it is: policy making cabined by the alternative choices 
presented in the cases. Judge Orlofsky did make reference to 
those nasty little judicial constructs of legislative intent known 
as “canons of statutory construction,” but quickly labeled them 
as a “dangerous approach,” because each side in the battle 
usually can find an equal number of canons to support its 
position.42 But ultimately Judge Orlofsky concluded that his role 
was to make a “judgment call.”43 Judge Politan had a broader 
view of the role of legislative history in the process of statutory 
interpretation: “You bring to that decision your own background, 
your own thoughts about the matter, and in essence perhaps you 
do put yourselves in the position of being the super legislators. 
Somebody had to do it. The buck stops with the judiciary.”44 And 
as for Judge Cowan, the senior judge on the panel, he reflected 
that Scalia’s textualism had informed his own decision-making 
process: “In most legislative interpretation [cases] I’m pretty 
much a follower of Justice Scalia . . . . You look at the text and 
decide what to do.”45 But Judge Cowan noted that, in some cases, 
judges are forced into the role of “playing God.”46 And by “playing 
God,” Judge Cowan meant that a judge’s primary objective 
should be to reach a just decision: 
I think I have to be brutally honest with you and say the 
unspeakable, that I would decide the case based on what I perceive 
to be the most just manner of resolving the matter before me, and 
that all of these tools of legislative history, canons and so forth, 
would merely be techniques that I would employ to write a 
decision. . . . I think that’s what Courts do and I think we have to say 
it as it is, and that’s how I would resolve the matter.47 
  
 40 Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 37. 
 41 Id. at 35. 
 42  Id. at 38. 
 43 Id. at 38. 
 44 Id. at 35. 
 45 Id. at 59. 
 46 Id. at 59-60. 
 47 Id. at 43-44. 
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The conversation then turned to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
through which Congress explicitly overruled the Ward’s Cove 
decision and placed the burden of persuasion for the business 
defense on employers.  
The 1991 provision led almost immediately to litigation 
over whether the new law would apply retroactively to 
plaintiffs with pending claims. On this point, the statute was 
silent. The Senate had discussed the retroactivity of the law, 
but it could not reach an agreement.48 Ultimately, the Senate 
reached an impasse over the legislation on this timing issue 
and agreed to punt.49 As a Senate staff member remarked, “We 
didn’t have the votes on the left [for retroactivity]. . . . The deal 
was cut to . . . leave it to the courts to pound out the issue.”50 
And that is exactly what the courts did, until the matter finally 
reached the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,51 
in which the Court decided against retroactivity on the basis of 
a canon that required explicit statutory language for 
retroactive application. 
I asked each of the judges at the conference how they 
would have decided this case. Politan and Cowen voted against 
retroactivity; Orlofsky favored it. 
CONCLUSION 
What I think we can learn from the above exchanges is 
that it is impossible to establish a law-based rule, in the way 
Scalia suggests, for the interpretation of unclear statutes. While 
clear language should always govern, in most cases, the language 
of the statute is not clear. Unclear statutes inevitably place a 
policy decision on the judiciary. Probative legislative history 
reduces that burden and, most importantly, reflects legislative 
meaning. Without legislative history, it is always a judgment call. 
The “intelligible theory” that Scalia champions just doesn’t cut it. 
That is what each of the judges above tells us in describing their 
personal experiences with statutory interpretation. 
  
 48 Id. at 50. 
 49  Id. 
 50 Dispute over Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act Stems from Legislative 
History, Hill Staffer Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 14, Jan. 22, 1992, at A-13. 
 51 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994). 
